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Localisation is a key element of the humanitarian reform agenda. However, there are
continuing debates regarding its form and emphasis, linked to understandings of the local,
the role of the state and the implications for interpretation of humanitarian principles of “de-
internationalised” humanitarian response. This paper considers UK engagement with the
localisation agenda, particularly through examination of the policies and programmes of
the Department for International Development (DFID). The UK was a major contributor to
dialogue on localisation at the World Humanitarian Summit of 2016 and has subsequently
shown strong support for Grand Bargain commitments and implementation of a larger
proportion of programmes involving cash transfers. Overall, however, advance on this
agenda has been limited. The paper notes three major areas of constraint. First, logistical
concerns have frequently been noted, particularly with respect to tasks such as
procurement and financial monitoring. This has limited the engagement of many local
actors lacking organisational capacity in these areas. Second, conceptual ambiguity has
also played a significant role. Localisation is poorly theorised, and the roles, functions and
capacities—beyond procurement of supplies and emergency technical assistance—that
local actors may be able to fulfil far more effectively than international ones are not
frequently addressed. Narrowly framed understandings of principles such as
independence and impartiality, for instance, appear to severely limit confidence in
engaging with local religious actors. Third, political considerations appear to have
increasingly limited the space for more radical interpretations of the implications of
localisation. Successive UK Secretaries of State for International Development have
defended the commitment to a fixed proportion of Gross National Income (GNI) for
development assistance based on strong public support for UK aid expenditure to
reflect national interests and values. In this context, there are few clear political
incentives to cede power over decision-making regarding UK Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA) to national and local actors in a manner required for fundamental
localisation of humanitarian response. Even where there is a clear potential UK
interest—for example, bolstering capacity of local actors in contexts vulnerable to
humanitarian emergency to avert more costly emergency response—the public
perception of capacity strengthening (compared to life-saving humanitarian actions)
mitigates against such moves in a climate of contested public spending. The
establishment of a merged Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office in 2020
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signals the likelihood of a reframing of localisation. While some advancement in terms of
some logistical and conceptual barriers may be anticipated, issues of both national interest
and public perceptions of national interest seem likely to continue to constrain a more
radical implementation of localisation, particularly with current suspension of the
commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA.
Keywords: humanitarian action, government strategy, localisation, humanitarian reform, United Kingdom
INTRODUCTION
Humanitarian crises are becoming more frequent, complicated
and protracted. Violent conflict and human rights abuses have
seen record numbers of people forcibly displaced, with more
vulnerable to malnutrition, illness, violence and death. At the end
of 2019, UNHCR estimated that there were 79.5 million people
forcibly displaced worldwide (UNHCR 2020). The Syria
crisis–despite over half a million deaths and a fall in life
expectancy of over 13 years—has been displaced by the state
of affairs in Yemen as the pre-eminent situation of humanitarian
concern (Jabbour et al., 2021). Natural disasters are also
becoming more frequent and set to intensify due to the effects
of climate change, hitting low-income contexts hardest. Processes
of rapid urbanisation and natural disasters increasingly
happening in already fragile, conflict-affected contexts add
another layer of complexity for responding to such
humanitarian crises.
In an attempt to keep pace with the changing nature of
humanitarian crises, many actors have urged reform of the
humanitarian system. The World Humanitarian Summit
(WHS) in 2016, followed by the publication of United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA’s)
report in 2017: The New Way of Working (NWOW) highlighted
the principle of localisation as a key tenet of the humanitarian
reform agenda.
The UK has been a strong proponent of the agenda to make
humanitarian response more effective, efficient and save more
lives. Localisation, notably through putting more aid into the
hands of national and local actors, has been a prominent focus of
their reform efforts. However, while the UK has been highly
committed to promoting localisation within a wider
humanitarian reform agenda in terms of policy statements,
making significant headway in certain areas, the UK has been
criticised for not advancing practice at a sufficient pace. A
number of internal and external constraints have created
obstacles to the UK investing more significantly in, or more
meaningfully with, localisation. The recent merger of the
Department for International Development (DFID) and
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to create the
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)
presents some opportunities for putting localisation at the
heart of the UK’s humanitarian work. It also threatens to
exacerbate some existing constraints.
This paper seeks to take stock of the UK contribution to
advancing the principle and practice of localisation and, through
such analysis, identify issues of potential relevance for other
actors engaging with this agenda. It begins by positioning
localisation as a key component of the global humanitarian
reform agenda and identifying key debates framing its
understanding. It then uses this as a foundation to explore the
UK’s commitments to the humanitarian reform agenda generally,
and localisation more specifically. We then note a number of
initiatives implemented by DFID coherent with the localisation
agenda and the UK’s Grand Bargain commitments. However, we
also highlight how, despite these initiatives, UK advancement of
the localisation agenda has been limited. We link this lack of
advance to three major sources of constraint: logistical challenges,
conceptual ambiguity and political considerations. The paper
then reflects on the prospects for UK government
humanitarian policy under the auspices of the FCDO and
what this means for the UK’s future reform and localisation
efforts. It concludes with recommendations for advancing policy-
making and practice impact.
Localisation and the Humanitarian Reform
Agenda
Over the last decade, the requirements for what constitutes
“effective” humanitarian intervention have been called into
question as the humanitarian sphere comes to terms with
more frequent, complicated and protracted humanitarian
crises. It is widely acknowledged that the formal humanitarian
system has failed to keep pace with the changing nature of crises,
remaining “. . .outdated and resistant to change, fragmented and
uncommitted to working collaboratively, and too dominated by
the interests and funding of a few countries” (former Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon, cited in Aneja 2016, 3).
In response to this shifting humanitarian landscape, the first-
ever World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was held in 2016, led
by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The WHS brought together
over 9,000 participants representing 180 Member States,
including Heads of State and Government, hundreds of civil
society and non-governmental organisations, and partners
including private sector and academia (Agenda for Humanity
2021). The WHS generated numerous commitments and
launched many new partnerships and initiatives with the aim
of making meaningful change for the world’s most vulnerable
people (Agenda for Humanity 2021). Specifically, theWHS called
on states and other relevant stakeholders to commit to five
responsibilities: prevent and end conflict; respect the rules of
war; leave no one behind; work differently to end need; and invest
in humanity. As part of former General Secretary Ban Ki-moon’s
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agenda for reform, “One Humanity: Shared Responsibility”, the
WHS focused on reducing risk, vulnerability and overall need,
moving towards more long-term strategies to deal with the
underlying causes of humanitarian crises.
TheWHS saw agreement of a Grand Bargain between some of
the world’s largest donors and humanitarian organisations, with
the aim of gettingmore means into the hands of people in need, in
order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian
processes. This included a commitment to get more support and
funding to local and national responders. However, signatories of
the Grand Bargain also committed to working across a number of
work streams to implement this vision of humanitarian action
that go beyond funding including “a participation revolution” to
“include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect
their lives” (Grand Bargain 2021).
Subsequently, OCHA published its report New Way of
Working (NWOW) in 2017 which set out a vision of a
humanitarian sphere better equipped to address contemporary
humanitarian crises. Together the WHS and the NWOW (2017)
marked a significant commitment to the principle of localisation:
“. . .working over multiple years, based on the
comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors,
including those outside the UN system, towards
collective outcomes. Wherever possible, those efforts
should reinforce and strengthen the capacities that
already exist at national and local levels” (OCHA,
2017, p. 6)
Broadly, localisation “. . .is about decentralising power, money
and resources in humanitarian and development aid. It’s about
local actors influencing action and making decisions
throughout–with international actors (including INGOs)
stepping in only if and when necessary” (Humanitarian
Academy for Development 2020).
In terms of getting funding to local and national organisations
as directly as possible, there has been significant engagement by
the international community. For example, the Charter 4 Change,
an initiative led by national and international NGOs “to
practically implement changes to the way the Humanitarian
System operates to enable more locally-led response” (Charter
4 Change, 2021), is endorsed by over 420 national and local
organisations and 38 international NGOs. The Charter 4 Change
includes commitments to pass 25 percent of humanitarian
funding to National NGOs (NNGOs), and regularly publish
the proportion of funding routed in this manner (Charter 4
Change 2021).
There has, however, been a broadening of the localisation
agenda in recent years. While increasing direct funding to
national and local actors remains a priority, localisation may
also encompass ensuring that local actors have an input at the
strategic and decision-making levels, with international
actors–including International Non-Governmental
Organisations (INGOs)—stepping in only if and when
necessary (de Geoffroy and Grunewald 2017, 1). This sees the
localisation agenda shifting beyond an instrumental approach,
where local actors are viewed as implementing partners for
pre-conceived programs, to one engaging with local actors as
partners throughout the humanitarian program cycle, including
for processes of strategic decision-making. This requires a long-
term vision for building the capacity of national and local actors
to deliver aid and programming that is locally driven. In these
terms, the policy framework of localisation has moved closer to
an approach which emphasises local initiative and local
leadership (Wall and Helmund 2016, 11).
Key Debates on Localisation
There are a number of debates shaping approaches to localisation
and its relevance to humanitarian response. Once key area of
discussion concerns the understanding of the local.
Proponents of localisation commonly argue that humanitarian
responses that are led by local people and organisations, in which
the governments of affected countries assist and are accountable
to local civil society, are more appropriate and save more lives,
especially in response to smaller crises. The evidence base
supports a number of reasons why localising humanitarian
action can make interventions more effective, relevant,
appropriate and connected (see Ramalingham et al., 2013.;
Gingerich and Cohen 2015.; El Taraboulsi et al., 2016; De
Wolf and Wilkinson 2019; Wilkinson et al., 2020).
For example, local actors are often first responders to
humanitarian crises and can be the only responders in the
critical hours immediately after a disaster strikes. In 2015
following the earthquake in Nepal, local people were at the
forefront of time sensitive operations to rescue people trapped
under piles of rubble (El Taraboulsi et al., 2016). In certain
conflict settings or in remote areas, local actors may be the
only ones with access to affected populations (Featherstone
2015; IFRC 2018). They are also generally seen as more
accountable to affected populations as they are present in
communities during and following crises (Gingerich and
Cohen 2015).
Other potential arguments for the primacy of local actors
include the fact that they have a potentially strong position in
linking preparedness and response (De Wolf and Wilkinson
2019, 10). For example in Gabon, tensions were expected to
rise as a result of the presidential elections in 2016. The Gabonese
Red Cross Society carried out refresher courses on topics like first
aid, emergency response and communication to prepare for
potential outbreaks of violence. These skills were put into
practice when violence did break out (IFRC 2018). For many
local and regional organisations, the distinctions between
preparedness, relief, recovery and development are artificial at
best and ‘counterproductive’ at worst (Taylor et al., 2012). These
distinctions have been drawn by international actors, whereas
local actors and organisations are generally aware that their acute
needs are inextricably linked to other long-term needs within the
community (Taylor et al., 2012).
Being embedded in affected communities, local actors may
have the best understandings of the context and can therefore
identify and address particular needs. Responses to the challenge
of Ebola highlight the vital role that local actors play in
humanitarian responses, particularly for ensuring they are
contextually-driven (PaRD 2016, 8–9). At the start of the West
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Africa Ebola epidemic in 2014, public health specialists identified
that certain traditional practices, namely mourning rituals that
involve touching and washing highly infectious bodies, were
significantly contributing to the spread of the disease.
However, distrust in international bodies meant that it wasn’t
until interventions were made more local, establishing and
reinforcing links with local faith and community leaders, that
there was significant change in behaviour within communities
towards safe, as well as religiously and culturally accepted,
practices which helped stem the spread of the Ebola. The
Ebola crisis has highlighted the importance of decentralised
(WHO 2015), locally-rooted (Laverack and Manoncourt 2016),
and contextually-driven (Nabyonga-Orem et al., 2016) responses
to humanitarian crises.
With respect to such evidence, Fast and Bennett (2020)
conclude that humanitarian action that fails to account for the
diverse “local” is always less effective, less relevant andmore likely
to fall short of commitments to Do No Harm. They assert that
while “local humanitarian action is not always better, without it
humanitarian action is always worse” (Fast and Bennett 2020, 19).
However, Gingerich and Cohen (2015) are amongst those who
urge that in the framing of localisation the focus on the diverse
local is not exaggerated at the expense of appreciating the key role
of national states. Governments hold the responsibility to respect,
protect, facilitate and fulfil the rights of their citizens and are thus
seen as key actors in co-ordinating humanitarian response.
Countries affected by crises are increasingly resisting
international assistance and demonstrating their capabilities in
responding to crises. For example, in 2004 the Indian government
was resistant to international interventions following the
Tsunami and in 2007 the government of Mozambique
successfully handled the widespread flooding experienced in
the country without international assistance (El Taraboulsi
et al., 2016, 2). The effectiveness of this response, it can be
argued, may be more appropriately attributed to the
effectiveness of state-level preparedness and capacity than to
geographically local actors.
Schenkenberg (2016) suggests that an issue that did not receive
adequate attention at the WHS and in Grand Bargain
commitments on localisation is state sovereignty and the
shrinking of civic space. Giving more control to national state
actors may strengthen authoritarian regimes and lead to a
shrinking of civil space. The localisation agenda may, in these
terms, be used as a pretext for states to push back against the
presence of international humanitarian organisations. While a lack
of international presence in these contexts reinforces the needs to
build the capacity of local actors, restricted access for international
actors means that governments can act without international
observation and create cover for national governments to also
restrict the activities of civil society. Schenkenberg (2016) uses the
case study of Sudan to elaborate this concern:
“In March 2009, the government of Sudan did not
hesitate to stop more than a dozen international
NGOs from operating in the country. It did so as
part of its effort to “Sudanise the humanitarian
activities” under the claim that Sudanese
organisations had more than enough capacity to do
the job of their international colleagues (see Darfur
Consortium, 2009). The government neglected to
mention that it had also stopped three leading local
Sudanese NGOs from operating. These happened to be
organisations working on human rights and protection
issues” (Schenkenberg 2016, 17).
Finally, tensions also remain between the desire in part to “de-
internationalise” humanitarian responses and adherence of actors
within the formal humanitarian system to prevailing
interpretations of the humanitarian principles of impartiality,
neutrality and independence. For many the definition of
humanitarianism from the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC)—calling for the independent, neutral and impartial
provision of relief to victims of armed conflict and natural
disasters—is the barometer against which humanitarian action
is measured (Barnett and Weiss 2011).
Until recently, the humanitarian principles were treated as
universal. However, changes in the nature of conflicts,
increasingly complicated contexts in which humanitarians
work and a proliferation of humanitarian organisations have
created a climate in which the humanitarian principles are
debated, contested and negotiated (see Hilhorst and
Schmiemann 2002; Hammond 2015). Questions have been
raised around whether the core humanitarian principles are
applicable in all situations. For example, adherence to the
principle of neutrality, according to classical humanitarianism,
provides humanitarian actors with access to affected populations
as it testifies to the apolitical nature of the humanitarian agency,
protecting the operational space within which they operate
(Kellenberger 2004; Hammond 2015).
The unquestioning adherence to the principle of neutrality has
also been challenged, particularly in contexts of human rights
abuses. International humanitarian organisations including the
ICRC have been criticised for not speaking out against atrocities
like the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide. These events and
the failure to speak out against them have seen some INGOs re-
think their adherence to the principle of neutrality. The ICRC has
apologised for its “failure to help and protect the millions of
people who were exterminated in the death camps” (ICRC 2020).
Medecins Sans Frontieres also questioned whether it was
acceptable for them and other humanitarian organisations to
“remain silent” during the Rwandan genocide in the name of
neutrality (MSF 2014).
Nevertheless, for the ICRC and many other major
humanitarian organisations, the ICRC’s definition of
humanitarianism and adherence to the core humanitarian
principles remains the “gold standard” and perceived
departures from those principles is actively resisted (Barnett
and Weiss 2011, 29). Therefore, concerns over whether local
actors are less inclined to be neutral and act impartially and
independently than international actors, raising issues around
equal coverage to affected populations, can produce significant
resistance towards the localisation agenda (Obrecht 2014).
Debates around the role(s) of local faith actors in the
humanitarian sphere, as distinct from International Faith-Inspired
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Development Organisations (IFIDOs) (Jennings et al., 2021), in
some ways epitomise these fears around engaging local actors for
humanitarian responses.Major IFIDOs occupy a prominent place in
the formal humanitarian architecture (see Gaillard and Texier 2010;
Ferris 2011; OCHA 2016). Many IFIDOs were incorporated into the
formal humanitarian sphere during its processes of secular
codification from the end of the 19th through the 20th century,
and so largely adhere to the “secular script” of humanitarianism and
its interpretation of principles of neutrality, impartiality and
independence (Deneulin and Bano 2009; Ager and Ager 2011,
457,; Burchardt 2012).
While IFIDOs, many of whom themselves commit to the
humanitarian principles, are well-established in the humanitarian
sphere, questions are often raised relating to whether local faith
actors are less inclined to be neutral and act impartially and
independently. Concerns around equal coverage, proselytization
and tensions with human rights approaches (PaRD 2016) are
often presented as reasons for why local faith actors are not
suitable partners for humanitarian action. These fears that local
faith actors may not see humanitarian principles as the principal
basis for determining response are not unfounded; many religious
actors are, by their very definition, partial, and potentially politically
entrenched (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager 2013). Principles of
compassion, sacrifice and solidarity may play a more influential
role on engagement in humanitarian response. As Burchardt notes,
local faith actors generally employ strategies that
“follow their own rationality, which cuts across the
formal/informal divide [and] in limited ways also
engender their own form of power, even if the power
remains largely invisible in formal accounts” (2012, 31).
Localisation thus requires a recognition of both the plurality and
complexity of such local dynamics and the positionality and
hegemonic presumption of the global humanitarian regime
regarding the interpretation of such concepts as “neutrality” and
“impartiality” defined according to an international perspective.
However Ager and Ager have observed how the negotiation of the
Core Humanitarian Standard (Core Humanitarian Standard 2021)
involved international agencies clinging to the totemic value of
such terms, while conceding that there were many issues on which
in practice their mandate positioned them as far from neutral and,
indeed, often active campaigners (2015, 92). Ager and Ager also
note profound asymmetry in the application and interpretation of
the principle of independence. They observe the irony and
incongruity of a situation in Jordan where:
“An international secular agency receiving funding
from a Western government with a clear political
interest in local containment of refugee displacement
declines to partner with a local faith-based organization
mobilizing funds within its local community on the
basis that the status of the latter compromises
humanitarian principles” (2015, 92).
The challenges that local faith actors pose to the presumptive
interpretation of humanitarian principles appear inevitable in
this context of global humanitarian reform. According to
Hilhorst and Jansen (2010) arena approach to
humanitarianism, the introduction of different humanitarian
actors in the humanitarian arena inevitably renegotiates
humanitarianism. Localisation brings in a variety of non-
traditional actors, at the local, national and regional levels, to
the humanitarian arena (Pacitto and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013),
with a diversity of skills, experiences and perspectives.
Proponents of localisation suggest that engaging with a variety
of locally-led activities serves to leverage the responsibilities and
capacities of states, civil society and affected communities (Zyck
and Krebs 2015). However collective action and localisation may
not only expand the space in which different actors, including
those outside the traditional, formal humanitarian sphere, can
engage with humanitarian interventions, but may also expand the
understanding of humanitarianism itself.
Localisation and UK Commitment to
Humanitarian Reform
What role has the UK Government played in the evolution of the
localisation agenda? The UK is a major humanitarian donor,
providing around £1.56 billion for humanitarian response in
2017–2018, half of which was channelled through UN
agencies. Humanitarian reform has been a prominent element
of UK policy for successive governments. As the principal
government actor regarding humanitarian response, DFID
sought to use its influence as a major funder of UN
humanitarian agencies to build their capacities to improve
global humanitarian practice. It is recognised to have pursued
a clear set of reform objectives including better coordination,
more flexible funding and greater use of cash transfers, although
the UK’s record in promoting practical reforms to date is mixed
(ICAI 2018, 3).
In 2011, DFID published the Humanitarian Emergency
Response Review (HERR) positioned by then Secretary of State
Andrew Mitchell as an “ambitious agenda. . .to change the way in
which we fund the system, making it more effective and efficient,
particularly in the first hours of an emergency” (Mitchell 2011).
The HERR signalled several areas of strategic development,
presented as seven “threads”, setting out the UK’s ambition to
reform the international humanitarian system. First, the UK
committed to “. . .developing a more anticipatory approach,
using science to help both predict and prepare for future
disasters and conflict” (DFID 2011, 4). Second, the HERR
focused on resilience, including “engaging more closely with
local people and institutions so as to strengthen local capacity”
(DFID 2011, 4). The third thread of the UK’s Humanitarian reform
agenda was to improve leadership across the humanitarian system,
while the fourth was to boost innovation for more effective and
efficient aid delivery. The UK committed to being more
transparent and accountable “towards both donor and host
country populations” (DFID 2011, 4) as its fifth thread. Sixth,
the UK sought to create new humanitarian partnerships to better
influence and work within the humanitarian system. Finally, the
HERR committed the UK to strengthen humanitarian space,
ensuring access and protection, especially in conflict-affected
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areas. Localisation was a prominent theme within the UK’s
developing humanitarian reform agenda and was implicit in
statements in the HERR, such as:
“Donor agencies like DFID have to work with
governments, and with affected people, as well as
with aid agencies. They have to support local
institutions rather than weaken them” (DFID 2011, 13)
The report acknowledged the important role local actors play
as first responders in times of crisis. It also highlighted how the
governments of many countries routinely affected by disasters
have become adept at responding to them and preventing
further crises. Similarly, the report criticised the persistently
dominant paradigm that casts local actors as passive actors
waiting to be rescued by the international community. Crucially,
in keeping with analysis by other actors regarding the
unsustainability of the prevailing humanitarian system,
HERR concluded that to not undertake a process of
localisation would be costly; with local capacities not being
utilised, beneficiaries not involved in the response and the
quality of delivery low.
The HERR recognised the UK’s historical failures in this
domain due to a previous lack of conscious strategy in relation
to funding local and national actors. While DFID had
undoubtedly funded many local and national NGOs indirectly,
as many INGOs funded by DFID work with local partners, there
had been a lack of direct funding for governments enduring crises
and a “hit and miss” record of funding national and local NGOs
(DFID 2011, 13).
The will to localise humanitarian responses is present
implicitly across all seven threads of the HERR, calling for the
integration of national and local actors in humanitarian
leadership and creating new partnerships with a range of
actors and groups, including some at the national and local
levels such as “emerging nations, NGOs, the private sector,
faith groups, and the diaspora” (DFID 2011, 9). However, the
influence of the localisation agenda is most explicit in the second
and fifth threads of the HERR, as evidenced above. The HERR
sought to embed resilience in development programmes, which
requires more of a focus on regional, national and local capacities.
The ambition was to fund national and local actors more directly
and to “preserve international capacity for those disasters that are
truly overwhelming” (DFID 2011, 13). One of the
recommendations in the HERR states that:
“DFID should promote national response capacities of
governments and civil society in at risk countries
including: The development of national resilience
strategies; The establishment of direct funding
mechanisms; Regional funding mechanisms where
they add value; Through civil society organisations
such as Red Cross and Crescent Societies; National
and local private companies which are able at the
country level to support entrepreneurial and market
solutions, which will increase in resilience and improve
response” (DFID 2011, 31)
The HERR also emphasised the importance of downward
accountability to affected populations. It highlights an
“accountability deficit” where “people who are on the receiving
end of”UK assistance “are rarely consulted on what they need, or
able to choose who helps them, how. . .” (DFID 2011, 8). In
response to the review, Secretary of State Mitchell emphasised the
importance of downward accountability in his statement to the
House of Commons:
“We must always be accountable for and transparent
about how we spend our development budget. It is
taxpayers’ money. That duty of accountability extends
not only to British citizens and taxpayers, but to those
who depend upon our aid. We will therefore make
accountability central to our humanitarian work and do
more to measure our own impact and that of our
partners.” (Mitchell 2011)
The HERR laid the foundations for the UK to be a major
contributor to dialogue on the issue of localisation at the WHS in
2016. DFID was very active in the lead-up to the WHS and as a
result, elements of its thinking are reflected in the Grand Bargain
(ICAI 2018, 17), an outcome that the new Secretary of State,
Justine Greening, highlighted in the Houses of Parliament
(Greening 2016). Indeed, following her attendance at the
WHS, Greening made a number of commitments towards this
new vision of humanitarianism, keen to demonstrate the UK’s
leadership in addressing global crises. For example, Greening
(2016) highlighted the importance of finding a new approach to
addressing protracted crises, committing the UK to “an extra £30
million of support to a new joint fund for education in
emergencies which was launched at the Summit to make sure
no child misses out” (Greening 2016). This financial commitment
was to contribute to finding a new approach to protracted crises,
building on the UK’s Supporting Syria and Region Conference
the February before, which promised to scale up the approach
begun in Syria to address protracted crisis and displacement more
broadly. This approach included going beyond basic needs to
invest in education, jobs and livelihoods, reflecting a WHS
commitment to bridge the humanitarian-development divide.
According to OCHA’s NWOW, this was the principle that was
most widely accepted during the WHS (2017, 4). Through
bringing humanitarianism and development closer together,
the aim was to address the root causes of crises as well as
their consequences. This commitment to the use of UK
convening power was further demonstrated by the UK co-
chairing a high level event specifically around new approaches
to protracted forced displacement (DFID 2017). The forum
agreed on five core principles, on which the UK’s new
approach to protracted forced displacement came to be based,
known as the Wilton Park Principles. The commitment to
localisation is evident in these principles, including in relation
to working through, and strengthening, national and local
systems and support for host communities to build local
cohesion.
Subsequently, DFID’s Humanitarian Reform Policy (HRP)
was published in 2017, building on the HERR and following
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the WHS. The HRP highlights a couple of major changes in the
UK’s humanitarian responses. Firstly, the UK commits to helping
other countries prepare for humanitarian crises, through building
resilience and resolving conflicts, not just responding when
disaster strikes. The HRP also commits to bridging the
humanitarian-development divide and pushing for radical
reform of the international system to make it more efficient
and innovative, including working with the private sector.
Once again, the role of localisation is implicit throughout:
seeking to build the capacity of local and national actors, and
strengthen international capacity to step in when national and
local systems are overwhelmed. The HRP builds on the UK
government’s response to Lord Ashdown’s HERR, highlighting
the importance of “building the resilience of individuals,
communities and countries to withstand shocks and recover
from them” (DFID 2017, 5) as one of their seven policy goals
for improving the effectiveness of UK humanitarian support. The
HRP further recognises that local actors are first responders in
times of crises and commits to strengthening “local actors” ability
to respond. . .and the capacity of national governments and
regional organisations to anticipate disasters and respond
accordingly’ (DFID 2017, 9). The HRP demonstrates the UK’s
persistent commitment through policy statements to getting
humanitarian assistance more directly into the hands of
affected populations. It is one of many examples of the UK’s
high level commitments to humanitarian reform in general and
localisation specifically.
The UK’s Humanitarian Reform Agenda and
Localisation: Mixed Results
A concrete example of the UK’s efforts to bring about reform
within the UN-led humanitarian sector is its introduction of
Payment by Results to UN humanitarian agencies. This initiative
sees 30 percent of the funding to UN humanitarian agencies
conditional on their making satisfactory progress as a group
towards reform objectives from theWHS and the Grand Bargain.
If sufficient progress is not made, the UK may withhold some of
the funding. The remaining 70 percent of funding remains
guaranteed. However, failure to make sufficient progress
towards the outlined reform agenda could affect the amount
of core funding offered to agencies in the future.
One of the criteria against which the UK’s Payment by Results
initiative measures the performance of UN agencies is
strengthening localisation and delivering through national and
local partners. The UK has implemented a number of initiatives
through DFID, coherent with the localisation agenda, including
support for the Grand Bargain commitments and the
implementation of a larger proportion of programmes
involving cash transfers. In keeping with commitments made
as part of the Grand Bargain, the UK has been “. . .highly
influential in promoting the use of cash transfers” (ICAI 2018,
18). In the area of cash-based programming for improving global
humanitarian practice DFID has been recognised as a thought
leader, encouraging the use of cash transfers as a form of
humanitarian support, instead of distributing food and
household items (ICAI 2018, 18). DFID has approached cash-
based programming in a structured way, building evidence to
support its case, engaging in high-level advocacy and funding
initiatives at country level. DFID has played a key role in the
growing use of cash in humanitarian response, which doubled in
volume between 2014 and 2016 to $2.8 billion (ICAI 2018, iii).
While cash transfers may not always be appropriate, and risks in
different settings need to be taken into account, increasing the use
and coordination of cash programming was one of the Grand
Bargain’s commitments to getting more aid into the hands of
those in need, to empower them to make the decisions that affect
their lives. Cash has been presented as a “catalyst” for positive reform
in the humanitarian sphere, with links to other reforms including the
push for localisation. In the right conditions, cash transfers can
stimulate localmarkets while affordingmore dignity to the recipients
(World Bank Group 2016, viii). There is evidence that cash transfers
can help effectively meet the needs of people in fragile contexts
instead of, or to complement, in-kind aid. Beyond the benefits for
local and national actors, cash-based programming is inherently
multi-actor and multisector with national actors, governments,
donors, the private sector and civil society playing critical roles in
ensuring improvements for the humanitarian sphere’s effectiveness
(World Bank Group 2016, viii).
Perhaps the most explicit example of the UK’s commitment to
put national and local actors at the centre of humanitarian
responses is DFID’s Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness
Programme (DEPP). This £40 million project, which ran from
2014 to 2019, worked in high risk countries (Kenya, Ethiopia,
South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique,
Jordan, Myanmar, Philippines, Bangladesh and Pakistan) to
promote disaster preparedness. The overall objective of DEPP
was to “improve the quality and speed of humanitarian response
in countries that are at risk of natural disasters of humanitarian
emergencies” (Pham et al., 2018, 6), with one of its key
approaches to build the capacity of local and national
humanitarian staff and communities. The programme was
delivered through support to two non-governmental consortia:
the START network and the Communicating with Disaster
Affected Communities Network (CDAC-N).
DFID was the majority funder of the START network, which
represents one of the most tangible of its investments in the
localisation agenda. The START network is made up of aid
agencies from five continents which seek to drive change in
the global aid system through innovation, fast funding, early
action, and localisation (START Network 2021). The START
network embodies the principles of localisation by seeking to
address what it sees as the main challenges to effective
humanitarian responses including: slow and reactive funding,
centralised decision-making, and an aversion to change. It does
this through a number of initiatives such as the START fund, a
multi-donor pooled fund managed exclusively by NGOs to
provide rapid financing to under-funded, small to medium
scale crises, to address spikes in chronic humanitarian crises,
and to act in anticipation of impending crises. For example, the
START Fund in Bangladesh has piloted a new way of
decentralised working through national and regional hubs
which are in control of their own funds to which local and
national NGOs have direct access.
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The UK’s localisation efforts in the Disaster Risk Reduction
(DRR) sector also extends to funding the Humanitarian
Leadership Academy which seeks to build skills in the DRR
sector, particularly at the local and national levels in disaster-
affected countries (DFID 2017, 4). Collaboration is a key element
of the Academy’s work, with partners ranging from
“technology companies to universities, local
communities to multilateral corporations, drawing on
the knowledge, expertise and resources of a range of
organisations to ensure the best solutions are found for
those most in need” (Humanitarian Leadership
Academy, 2021).
A pertinent example of a DEPP project that epitomises its
commitment to the localisation agenda, was Shifting the Power
(STP), led by Action Aid and CAFOD, alongside Christian Aid,
Tearfund, Concern Worldwide and Oxfam in Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Ethiopia, Kenya and the DRC. The aim of the
project was
“[t]o support local actors to take their place alongside
international actors in order to create a balanced
humanitarian system that is more responsive and
accountable to disaster-affected communities” (Pham
et al., 2018, 6).
Another DEPP project that seeks to encourage the localisation
of disaster response is Financial Enablers (FE), led by Oxfam
alongside Tearfund and Christian Aid and implemented in the
Philippines. The goal here was
“[t]o transfer humanitarian capacity, autonomy and
decision making to organisations closer to people
affected by crisis, as a way of facilitating more
effective and appropriate aid” (Pham et al., 2018, 6).
An external evaluation by Harvard’s Humanitarian Initiative
(HHI) found that the constellation of projects that made up DEPP
had made some headway in putting local and national actors at the
heart of responses to disasters. For example, the evaluation
highlights how DEPP helped build buy-in from government
agencies for disaster preparedness, develop early warning
systems and build capacity across stakeholders including
national and local actors. Similarly, there were some real
improvements in individual, organisational and community
preparedness among DEPP beneficiaries, particularly among
local organisations (Pham et al., 2018, 13). Changes in the
capacity of local organisations led some of them to be eligible
for UN pooled funding, securing external emergency response
funds and being given leadership roles in humanitarian response
(Pham et al., 2018). However, the most significant area of progress
was seen in attitudinal changes towards—and increased support
for—the localisation agenda, including how international NGOs
consider, address and involve local actors and communities.
While the UK’s investments in cash-based programming have
been successful, many of its other reform objectives have not been
pursued as intensely and with mixed results (ICAI 2018, 27).
Indeed, ICAI has suggested that localisation is not being actively
pursued, except by mechanisms such as pooled funds which only
make up a small percentage of humanitarian funding (ICAI 2018,
30). Despite the commitments set out in the DFID 2017 HRP, in
practice, DFID was judged to have appeared “ambivalent” about
the objective of localisation (ICAI 2018, 30). While qualitative
and quantitative data from projects across DEPP for example
highlight changes in attitudes towards the localisation agenda,
they were not translated into quantitative behavioural change
related to localisation (Pham et al., 2018, 18). In general,
attitudinal change towards, and increased acceptance of, the
localisation agenda has been instigated, but the will to localise
humanitarian responses has not been sufficiently put into
practice. This, despite the UK’s commitment to humanitarian
reform generally, and localisation specifically, overall
advancement towards ensuring that humanitarian action is “as
local as possible as international as necessary” (Barbelet 2018, 1)
has remained limited.
Barriers for the UK’s Progress on
Localisation
This paper suggests three major barriers that have constrained the
UK’s progress towards localising its humanitarian efforts. While
this section will focus on the experiences of DFID in the UK, we
suggest that these constraints may be a useful lens through which
to consider the progress of other humanitarian actors.
Logistical Concerns
Logistical concerns around localisation have frequently been
noted, particularly with respect to tasks such as procurement
and financial monitoring. This has limited the engagement of
many local actors lacking organisational capacity in these areas.
On occasion, DFID’s reform agenda has created logistical
constraints that have not only failed to support localisation
efforts but have potentially undermined them. For example,
the ICAI (2018) independent review found that DFID’s
Payment by Results initiatives made the UK an increasingly
demanding donor. Introducing new reporting and due
diligence requirements that give greater oversight of how
recipients manage UK aid funds was time consuming for both
recipients and DFID staff, potentially drawing time away from
programme implementation. Similarly, subsequent to press
coverage of exploitation of procurement systems by certain
suppliers, Secretary of State Patel initiated a “supplier review”
which led to DFID requiring all implementing partners to engage
with more extensive due diligence checks of their local partners
and to report on their delivery chains. As a result, DFID often
lacked the capacity in country offices to provide funds directly to
local partners with weak management systems or directly support
their capacity development.
Similarly, in keeping with DFID’s Civil Society Partnership
Review (CSPR) which was published in 2016, DFID consolidated
its centrally distributed funding for Civil Society Organisations
(CSOs) into a few larger, competitive funding instruments (ICAI
2019, 5). These funding instruments, aimed at increasing
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engagement with CSOs, included stringent conditions and
requirements on CSOs awarded grants. While these criteria
individually could be justified, they were judged “collectively
onerous” (ICAI 2019, 6). They require high investments costs to
develop proposals leading to a low success rate for CSOs winning
grants. Ultimately, such stringent conditions and requirements
create significant obstacles for CSOs gaining funding.
DFID has thus clearly struggled to develop mechanisms
through which to work with a broader array of actors.
Crucially, DFID has not found a means to mobilise the
flexible funding needed to support local initiatives (ICAI 2018,
31). The lack of flexible funding presents significant constraints
on putting commitments to localisation into practice. The need
for this was recognised in the HERR back in 2021, though
subsequently the call for transparency appears to have
trumped speed and flexibility.
A further logistical constraint to localisation for DFID relates
to a lack of staff capacity. ICAI (2018) independent review
highlights that while DFID has begun to align its influencing
efforts at the international and country levels, its humanitarian
cadre has lacked the resources to support the grand ambitions
supported at the Grand Bargain. In regards to DFID’s broad
reform agenda, which includes an emphasis on localisation, ICAI
(2018) review suggests that DFID had not specified the changes it
wanted to see nor had it equipped its humanitarian cadre to take
issues of localisation forward. ICAI (2018) recommended in their
evaluation that DFID step up its engagement in international
working groups that seek to translate the Grand Bargain
Principles into practical measures to provide guidance to
country offices on how to pursue these measures.
There are a number of things that the UK needs to do to
overcome some of these logistical constraints to localisation. The
HII’s evaluation of DEPP calls for further understandings of
strategies that might enable donors to more easily support local
counterparts within the context of risk aversion and due diligence
processes (Pham et al., 2018, 28). The UK clearly needs to invest
in and build the capacity of staff, including at the country level,
to support local or civil society actors to access funding and to
navigate complicated application processes. The UK also needs to
fill gaps in knowledge around how to engage with a broader array
of actors if it is to engage, in the terms of the earlier discussion,
with the plural local beyond the state government.
Conceptual Ambiguity
We noted earlier how thinking about localisation is marked by
ongoing debates around understandings of the local, the role of
the state and the implications for interpretation of humanitarian
principles of “de-internationalised” humanitarian response. With
no consistent or agreed definition of localisation—Wall and
Hedlund (2016) noting that it can be used to describe all and
any activities involving local actors–the concept remains
conceptually ambiguous. This conceptual ambiguity creates
space for different stakeholders to interpret the localisation
agenda according to their own interests.
For example, many international actors define localisation in
terms of “partnerships”, to describe the way they work with local
organisations. However in practice, defining localisation in this
way tends to limit local and national organisations to
implementing partners, to whom international actors out-
source pre-determined and pre-conceived programme delivery
(Barbelet 2018, 6). Similarly, localisation is also frequently used to
describe the relationships international actors have with
communities through the language of “participatory
approaches”. However once again, in practice, this often refers
to approaches which at best invite beneficiaries to comment on
pre-designed projects (Wall and Hedlund 2016).
The narrow and superficial engagement with local actors that
may result from this conceptual ambiguity is clearly reflected in
DFID’s history of engaging with civil society. While DFID’s
HERR and CSPR recognise the potential value added through
engaging with a wide range of local and national actors for
humanitarian responses, in practice their engagement with
CSOs became increasingly constrained over the last decade.
The UK government has a long history of funding CSOs, even
before the establishment of DFID. DFID’s bilateral civil society
portfolio peaked from 2014 to 2015, where 25 percent of its
bilateral spend went to civil society (ICAI 2019). However, in
2016, nearly all of DIFD’s “unrestricted” or “core” funding for
CSOs to use as they saw fit was brought to an end. Instead,
DFID’s funding of CSOs became increasingly aimed towards the
pursuit of DFID-agreed priorities (ICAI 2019). In practice, this
meant that CSOs were often “treated as implementing partners
of mostly shorter-term projects, with funding tightly
conditioned by results frameworks” (ICAI 2019, 6). While
this shift did to some extent increase competition,
transparency and accountability, it also reduced “CSO’s
opportunities for self-driven capacity development, longer-
term strategic thinking and adaptation in the evolving
contexts in which they operated” (ICAI 2019, 6). Similarly,
while these funding instruments did include elements of CSO
capacity building, they remained overly focused on the
requirements and standards of DFID, overlooking the needs
of the CSO (ICAI 2019). Not only does this approach to
engagement with local actors exclude CSOs from decision-
making processes, allowing for the continuation of donor-led
responses, it also reduces the flexibility of CSOs to respond to
crises.
The specific ambiguity of what constitutes the “local” has also
influenced DFID’s approach to implementation of polices
regarding localisation. Wall and Hedlund (2016) have
highlighted how for the World Bank ‘community’ is
synonymous with “community-based organisations”. As a
result, the range of community-based humanitarian responders
outside of structures that resemble organisations is not
acknowledged. DFID appears to have followed the same path
in their CSPR (DFID 2016), a review of DFID’s partnerships with
civil society. The review focuses almost exclusively on its work
with CSOs, overlooking the variety of civil society actors, who do
not resemble an organisation, who respond to humanitarian
crises.
DFID’s track-record of working with local faith actors also
demonstrates the influence of a partial understanding of the
diversity of local resources. Based on a document review and
consultation with a broad range of DFID staff (DFID, 2020) a
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recent review found that in comparison with other states–notably
Germany and the USA–religious engagement by the
department–both centrally and in-country—
“could be characterised by disconnection, wariness and
a falling behind development literature and practice.
There continue to be examples of innovation and
effective partnership, but these tend to be ad hoc
rather than coherent reflections of a wider strategy”.
In examining the reasons for this, the review identified a
number of factors linked to the theme localisation. This
included operational challenges in partnering with local faith
groups, related to the logistical issues of working with small and
informal organisations noted in the previous section. However,
issues of conceptualisation of appropriate forms of engagement
were also flagged. There was clear uncertainty in establishing
policy and strategy for engagement with a group of actors and
institutions where there was such wide contextual variation in
religious expression and its political significance across the
settings in which the department worked. This appears to
reflect a discomfort in strategic engagement in an area where
the “local” is indeed diverse. The review also noted ‘a persistent
culture of “religious blindness” (notably reflected in approaches
to operationalising humanitarian principles such as
impartiality) which echoes the challenge noted earlier of
global humanitarian actors needing to become more self-
aware of their presumptions and positionality in a more
diverse humanitarian system.
In general, DFID’s commitment to localisation has been
reflected much more consistently with respect to state
governments than to local actors. However, in the context
of COVID-19 the UK government did take steps towards a
more localised humanitarian response through DFID’s Rapid
Response Facility which put out a call for proposals from
NGOs, including two criteria for supporting local efforts
(ICAI 2020; Mollett 2020). Applications needed to provide
at least ten percent of funds to local partners and they needed
to track and report on the level of funding local NGOs
received (Mollett 2020). More generally, however, the
COVID-19 pandemic has served to demonstrate the lack of
capacity and decision-making power that had been shifted to
national and local actors in the preceding years. The
withdrawal of many international humanitarian actors has,
in some cases, resulted in civil society being left to do the
heavy lifting without decision-making power. Media reports
from NGO staff in Somalia demonstrated that this left local
actors to carry the burden of response, information gathering,
and analysis of what’s happening on the ground, while
decision making processes remained UN-led (Cornish
2020). As a result, responses have been inefficient;
decisions have been slow and responses delayed, slowed
further by the lack of expatriate and international staff on
the ground. At best the COVID-19 response in Somalia has
been called inefficient, at worst, decisions made at a distance,
based on a lack of understanding of realities on the ground,
seem to have exacerbated health, economic and food
vulnerabilities (Cornish 2020).
Despite the UN continuing to perform poorly on partnerships
and getting funding to local NGOs, most of DFID’s funding for
COVID-19 responses went through UN agencies (ICAI 2020).
The Center for Global Development found that funding is still
failing to get to local actors directly; only 0.07 percent of funds
channelled through the UN reached national and local NGOs for
COVID-19 responses as of mid-June 2020 (Mollett 2020).
Overall, then, in the ambiguous conceptual space of the
localisation agenda the UK has generally taken a rather
narrow and superficial view of the “local”, with a primary
focus on supporting the responsibilities of state governments
to prepare for and manage humanitarian crises. The continued
emphasis has been on funding mechanisms, with significantly less
attention in policy and programming on building institutional
capacity, especially within civil society and at the most local level.
Since the analysis underpinning the HERR and the shaping of the
WHS agenda the UK government has shown little appetite for
engaging with the project of “de-internationalising”
humanitarian response. In response to rising global
tensions–e.g. the weakening of US commitment to
multilateralism, the rise of China, deteriorating relations with
Russia—the UK has firmly committed itself to preservation of an
international rules-based system as a major policy objective
(FCDOa, 2021). In this context, promoting de-
internationalisation by expanding the range of actors engaged
with coordination of humanitarian response to those outside the
traditional, formal humanitarian sphere becomes at best a
marginal, and at worst an unattractive, move.
Political Considerations
It is apparent, then, that underpinning the principle of
localisation are questions of power, and the need to shift the
power from international to local actors, both in terms of strategic
decision making and control of resources (de Geoffroy and
Grunewald 2017, 1). However, for members of the
international humanitarian community, there may be very
little political incentive, and insufficient appetite, to give up
power to more local actors. As a result, they focus on other
aspects of the localisation agenda such as cost effectiveness and
funding mechanisms.
A common argument for localisation made by UK politicians
initially was that it will increase cost effectiveness. This push for
cost effectiveness was part of DFID’s broader reform agenda,
introducing a stronger focus on Value for Money into
humanitarian practice (ICAI 2018, i). A strong driving force
behind this is an increasing awareness in UK politics of being
accountable to UK taxpayers for ODA expenditure. The influence
of accountability to UK taxpayers was acknowledged in the 2011
HERR which stated that “DFID is being asked to be more
accountable than ever before to UK taxpayers” through several
periods of heightened budgetary constraints (DFID 2011, 27).
This is also evidenced by the frequent mentions by successive
Secretaries of State for International Development in media
interviews, of the department’s responsibility to be accountable
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to UK taxpayers’ (Mitchell 2011; McVeigh 2018). The influence
of accountability to UK taxpayers on the UK’s humanitarian
reform agenda, and its role in shaping the reform narrative and
priorities, is clear in an interview given by then Secretary of State
David Mitchell in relation to the UK’s reform agenda and the
upcoming publication of the HERR in 2011:
“The truth is that if I go on television tonight and
announce 20 million pounds for Tanzania, the reaction
from many people will be to want to put their boot
through the television set, given the state of the deficit
and public debt in Britain. But if I announce that I am
going to help to get another 200,000 girls to school in
Tanzania, then with the British spirit of generosity and
concern for the least well-off, there is a chance to
capture people’s attention and support for this
budget.”(Davison, 2010)
Reporting and due diligence requirements gave DFID greater
ability to oversee how UK Aid is spent, however to some extent
this constrained DFID’s engagement with localisation.
Approaching localisation through a lens of cost efficiency has
been criticised. While there is a growing literature supporting
localisation for effective humanitarian response, there is a lack of
robust evidence showing localisation as cost-effective (Manis
2018, 3). Similarly, DFID’s framing of localisation in terms of
cost-efficiency has been criticised for keeping localisation efforts
narrow, with funding distributed through a limited number of
national and local partners. DFID’s approach to Value for Money
(now carried over to the FCDO) was controversial and DFID has
been criticised for driving down costs, rather than innovating to
improve results which will ultimately impact the quality of its
localisation efforts within broader humanitarian reforms (ICAI
2018, ii).
Particularly in times when public finances are tight, this
emphasis on cost-efficiency, Value for Money and
accountability to UK taxpayers has shrunk the space for
political conversations around aid and how to improve its
delivery. It has de-incentivised aid spending, despite the
investments necessary for humanitarian reforms, including
localisation. There is a perception amongst politicians, that
UK taxpayers are resentful over aid spending. Sensitivities to
this are understandable, given that during austerity policies in
Britain under David Cameron’s government, DFID’s budget
doubled in 10 years to more than £14 billion (Ashcroft 2019).
Former Secretary of State for International Development Rory
Stewart shared how hard it was to get politicians to talk about
aid and development and the UK to spend money in this sector
during times of austerity (Worley 2020). Stewart spoke of how
politicians would rather avoid the topic, particularly as voters
who were dealing with the repercussions of austerity measures
didn’t want to hear it. A reluctance to engage in public
discussion of humanitarian aid undoubtedly constrains
motivations and reform objectives generally and localisation
efforts specifically.
A lack of flexibility, innovation and room to fail within the
UK’s humanitarian responses risks creating obstacles to finding
ways to overcome the logistical constraints to the UK’s
localisation efforts. The evaluation of DEPP highlights that
there was scope to replicate and further scale up some
components of the programme. However, this would require
some components of the project to be modified and re-tested,
while others are replicated in different contexts and potentially on
a larger scale programme (Pham et al., 2018, 20). The
considerable investment required, and the growing political
climate making any apparent loosening of financial
accountability unacceptable, appears to have contributed to the
decision to not extend DEPP.
The prevailing political climate clearly de-incentivises
initiatives to shift decision making power and resources into
the hands of national and local actors, as this may be perceived to
limit accountability to UK tax payers. However, this overlooks the
other actors to whom aid agencies and donors are accountable. In
DFID’s Humanitarian Policy the importance of downward
accountability to beneficiaries—consulting with them on what
support is provided and how it is delivered—is emphasized
(DFID 2017, 16).
Beneficiary accountability was signalled as a core element of
DFID’s humanitarian work (DFID 2017, 19) by former Secretary
of State Andrew Mitchell, but it has been accountability to UK
taxpayers that has been emphasised by subsequent Secretaries of
State. However, there are grounds for seeing increasing the UK’s
downward accountability to affected populations as a means to
enhance accountability to tax payers, rather than as a rival
objective. The International Development Committee’s report
and survey on “Progress Tracking the Sexual Exploitation and
Abuse of Aid beneficiaries” found that localisation may play a key
role in stamping out sexual exploitation and abuse in the aid
system (Worley 2021a). The extensive report and survey
highlights the ways that the current aid system builds distrust
between local and aid actors by not including beneficiaries in the
design or implementation of humanitarian assistance. Such an
“us and them” dichotomy, reinforced by unequal power relations
and an enabling culture in aid agencies, creates space within the
aid system for the kind of exploitation and abuses of power
revealed to have taken place in Haiti in 2018, causing public and
political outrage.
Localisation in the FCDO: Challenges and
Opportunities
The merger of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
and DFID to form the FCDO in 2020 signalled a new era for the
management of development assistance in the UK, including
humanitarian response. This new governance arrangement
needs to be seen in the political context of not only the
completion of Brexit in January 2021 but also of the impact
of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Gross National Income
(GNI) from which UK ODA is committed and the broad
humanitarian context. Battling a global pandemic as it
simultaneously embarks on a road of political unknowns, as
in seeking a role for a “Global Britain” outside of the EU, has
created a world of contradictions in terms of the UK’s approach
to aid, development and humanitarianism. This creates both
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challenges and opportunities for the UK’s future localisation
efforts.
In terms of challenges, the political and economic context
brings further acute pressure for accountability to the UK tax
payer, a vocal and prominent scepticism around the amount of
aid flowing from the UK (Ashcroft 2019), and an increasing fiscal
squeeze as a result of substantial public spending in response to
COVID-19. While 2020 saw preparation for a cut in aid
expenditure commensurate with the projected fall in GNI,
2021 has seen suspension of the legally mandated spending
target of 0.7% of national income (Worley 2021b),
representing over a 30% cut in assistance. This has led to
projection of major reductions in support of key humanitarian
crises, including Yemen, countries impacted by the Syria conflict
and the DRC (Wintour 2021).
While the underlying fiscal pressures are very real, the scale of
these cuts clearly threatens the prevailing commitment to reform
of the humanitarian system. Without investment in
strengthening the capacities of actors at all levels to respond to
the increasingly frequent and complicated humanitarian disasters
the cycle of costly (in all terms) humanitarian disasters that could
have been mitigated by timely (and less costly) preparedness and
resilience measures will once again be set in motion.
Concerns have also been raised that with humanitarian and
development concerns more explicitly intertwined with UK national
interest in the new FCDO there will be even less political incentive to
ceding power to “other” (local) actors. However, without this step,
the UK and the international system more generally will fail to live
up to the commitments made to the principle of localisation. An
increasing political influence in the UK’s development and
humanitarian decision making in the FCDO may further
disincentivise shifting the centre of power in humanitarian
decision-making to national and local actors.
The search for an identity for a post-Brexit “Global Britain”
sees the UK active in mobilising and profiling its convening
power in multilateral fora. CoP26 and the G7 Presidency have
seen the UK prominent in discussion of pandemic recovery,
climate change and the “green growth” agenda that connects
the two. The profiling of aid cuts – and the Indo-Pacific pivot of
the 2021 UK Integrated Review of Security, Defence,
Development and Foreign Policy – suggests a weakening of
commitment to a number of fragile and conflict-affected
states. However, the Integrated Review also represents an
opportunity to operationalise a “joined-up” approach to the
roots of conflict and displacement that is marked by a strong
commitment to contextual analysis and engagement of – diverse
– local actors (Ferguson 2021). Bringing together the
development and humanitarian knowledge of DFID, and the
country-specific awareness and diplomatic skills of the FCO,
accompanied by a new international independence, present an
important opportunity to work more closely with countries,
national governments and civil society on this agenda.
The FCDO role in drafting the policy paper on the G7 Famine
Prevention and Humanitarian Crises Compact for the G7 Foreign
and Development Ministers meeting of May 2021 (FCDOb 2021)
provides some early indication of likely policy emphases. The paper
sees continuing commitment to “effective response to crises”, and
for this to be achieved through initiatives addressing critical
funding gaps; promotion of humanitarian access; respect for
International Humanitarian Law; scale-up anticipatory action;
enhancing crisis preparedness and response; and strengthening
data and analysis to facilitate early action. Localisation is noted just
once in the document, in the context of re-affirmingGrand Bargain
Commitments related to the first of these areas: funding. The
overall emphasis is statist, with an emphasis on “support [ing]
governments to discharge. . . [their] responsibility to address the
needs of their own populations” (FCDOb 2021, p. 7). However,
with respect to the issue of scaling-up anticipatory action there is a
recognition of the importance of local action in the commitment to
“grow support to the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund and the Start
Fund to ensure local, including women-led, organisations can
access finance to act ahead of shocks” (FCDOb 2021, p. 10).
It is too early to judge what UK commitments to humanitarian
reform and localisation will be taken forward by the FCDO
following the UK G7 Presidency. However, it is clear that both
the decision to merge DFID and the FCO, and the decision to cut
the aid budget, has increased attention to and reinvigorated
debates around the UK’s approach to humanitarianism. While
some advancement in terms of negotiating the logistical and
conceptual barriers to localisation may be anticipated, issues of
both national interest—and public perceptions of national
interest—seem likely to constrain a more radical
implementation of localisation and, indeed, reverse the
progress that has been made in recent years.
Recommendations for Policy Making and
Practice Impact
What does the preceding analysis imply for policy-making
regarding humanitarian response, particularly with regard to
policy that will have practice impact? We close by identifying
recommendations for the FCDO, the principle institution with
responsibility for UK government contribution in this area, as
well as for other actors for whom the lessons of this case study
may have utility.
First, in the context of the UK government’s “Global Britain”
aspirations there is an urgent need for the FCDO to clarify its
position on the localisation agenda. From a highly influential
position in shaping this agenda in the context of humanitarian
reform 5 years ago there is a risk that the UK falls to the margins
of global cooperation in this area. To the extent that FCDO
strategy within the Johnson government increasingly reflects an
emphasis on bilateral above multilateral investments, this
positioning needs to clearly signal what residual role, if any,
the UK seeks to play in shaping (and financially supporting) the
investments of multilateral institutions in a manner consistent
with the commitments made at the WHS in 2017 and in the
NWOW in 2018. Equally, this positioning needs to demonstrate
what elements of localisation are reflected in bilateral
relationships to foster preparedness and capacity building in
states vulnerable to humanitarian crisis, as committed to in
the recent G7 Foreign and Development Ministers meeting.
Second, this political positioning needs to be reflected in
much clearer technical conceptualisation and
Frontiers in Political Science | www.frontiersin.org September 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 68706312
Goodwin and Ager UK Government Engagement on Localisation
operationalisation of localisation strategies within the FCDO.
The preceding analysis has documented how lack of clarity on
what constitutes localisation severely undermines effective
action. In respect of one theme of the preceding analysis,
recent moves in establishing a coherent approach to strategic
engagement with faith actors–and developing the religious
literacy within the organisation to sustain this—are a step in
this direction.
Third, in terms of the logistical apparatus to operationalise
localisation, the FCDO needs to establish and validate processes
that support not only funding flows but also the levels of decision-
making and local autonomy regarding expenditure. Accountability
mechanisms that strike the appropriate balance between fiscal risk
management and delivery chain mapping and enabling swift,
discretionary, local commitment of resources are vital.
Although developed as a case study of UK government
engagement with the principle of localisation, the presented
analysis potentially has relevance for other actors. In
particular, we identify two further recommendations.
For NGOs and civil society actors committed to advocacy
regarding localisation we commend incorporation of analysis of
the political cycle operating within states in their strategic
engagement. Political transition through the UK coalition,
Cameron, May and Johnson administrations has been
substantial. While there has been a degree of momentum
behind earlier policy commitments, the narrative of
humanitarian policy, the political values and sentiments shaping
it, and the alliances mobilised or marginalised regarding change
have all shifted radically. To be effective, advocacy with
governments needs to be mindful of such shifts, recognising the
new opportunities as well as barriers that they create.
Finally, we commend academic researchers to explore the
relevance of the themes of logistical concerns, conceptual
ambiguity and political considerations for understanding the
translation of policy to practice regarding the principle of
localisation with other donors and agencies. In spanning the
domains of political strategy to operationalised practice these
themes provide a prompt for considering translational processes
from policy formulation to implementation. The wider utility of
this framing needs to be considered.
Notes
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